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Abstract
Using a simple two-group model of the private provision of public goods, this paper
investigates how endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is aected by dier-
ent types and degrees of between-group interactions. We show that when between-group
interactions are of the same directions and weak (strong), within-group cooperation for
providing public goods will (will not) occur in each group for strategic reasons. On the
other hand, when between-group interactions are of the opposite directions or unidirec-
tional, within-group cooperation will necessarily occur. In addition, endogenous formation
of cooperation is independent of absolute (individual) levels of income as well as income
distribution between agents, which corresponds to an extended version of Warr's neutral-
ity theorem. We also show whether endogenous formation of within-group cooperation
is benecial or harmful to each group crucially depends on the degree of between-group
interactions. The variation in the interaction degree leads to three dierent types of games
concerning welfare consequences: the Prisoners' Dilemma, Coordination Game, and Invis-
ible Hand.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that when public goods are privately provided by individuals in a certain group,
they can jointly increase their individual payos by cooperating to provide the public goods.
However, such cooperation may not be as benecial to them as non-cooperation if there are
other outside (third-party) individuals or groups that strategically interact with them through
public goods consumption. This is because cooperation in one group may induce negative
reactions from other individuals or groups. In other words, the related individuals' or groups'
reactions must be considered when calculating the protability of cooperative provision of
public goods in a certain group.
Economists have investigated the protability of cooperation in providing public goods
considering third-party behavior in a wide variety of topics. For example, in the context
of military alliances or arm races, Bruce (1990) and Ihori (2001) demonstrate that all allied
countries may be worse o when the allies cooperate on defense spending rather than when they
do not if there are certain adversary alliances. This is because cooperative increase in defense
spending in one alliance induces the adversary alliances to increase their defense spending.
In the context of foreign aid, Torsvik (2005) considers a case where several altruistic donors
provide aid to alleviate poverty in another country. He shows that donor cooperation may
adversely change the domestic policy in the receiving country by aggravating the crowding
out problem; thus, it may not be benecial for the donors.1 In the context of horizontal
mergers, Salant et al. (1983) indicate that in a Cournot model with symmetric rms, a merger
(or a cartel) will not be protable because of the outside rms' business stealing reactions.
In addition, a considerable number of studies on a public-goods experiment investigate the
eectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavior.2 The common
element among these studies is that cooperative provision of public goods within one group
depends on the nature of their interaction with other (outside) agents or groups.3
Using a simple model of the private provision of public goods with two distinct groups, this
study investigates the eects of variations in between-group interactions on endogenous forma-
tion of within-group cooperative strategies. The model has two stages: rst, the cooperation
stage where agents decide whether to cooperate with other agents in the same group when
providing a group-specic public good; second, the contribution stage where agents voluntarily
contribute to the public good. The amount of group-specic public good in one group has
positive or negative eects on that in another group, which we call between-group interactions.
Within this framework, we examine the endogenous determination of within-group cooperation
and its welfare implications.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we show that endogenous
formation of within-group cooperation crucially depends on the characteristics of between-
1For an empirical study on foreign aid including the public-good nature of the aid and strategic interaction
among donor countries, see Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006).
2See Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), Bornstein et al. (2002), Tan and Bolle (2007), and Reuben and Tyran
(2010) among many others for this point.
3In the eld of anthropology, Kitchen and Beehner (2007) review the relationship between inter-group inter-
action and intra-group cooperation among non-human primates. For various types and properties of strategic
interactions and cooperative behaviors in providing global public goods, see Cornes and Sandler (1996), Sandler
(1997), and Barrett (2007).
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group interactions, and not on any other variable. In the case of asymmetric direction of
between-group interactions (i.e., the case where one group's contributions to public goods
have positive external eects on agents in another group, but the reverse has negative external
eects) and unidirectional interaction (i.e., the case where one group's contributions have
positive or negative external eects on another group, but the reverse of either has no eect
on the group), within-group cooperation necessarily emerges in each group. In the case of
symmetric direction of between-group interactions, cooperation (non-cooperation) emerges in
each group if the between-group interactions are weak (strong). If they are intermediate, a
coordination situation emerges.
Second, we show that within-group income redistribution has no eect on the equilibrium
utility of each agent as well as endogenous formation of cooperation, corresponding to the
extended version of Warr's neutrality theorem (1983). Furthermore, interestingly, we obtain
the result that between-group income redistribution and any kind of income changes have no
eect on the result of endogenous formation of cooperation. These results correspond to the
extended version of Warr's neutrality theorem concerning formation of cooperation.
Finally, we answer the question of whether endogenous formation of cooperation yields a
superior outcome. We show that the variation of between-group interactions yields three dif-
ferent types of games in the cooperation stage: the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD), Coordination
Game (CG), and Invisible Hand (IH). PD situations arise if between-group interactions are
strongly positive or moderately negative. In the former case of strongly positive interactions,
endogenous formation of cooperation leads to mutual non-cooperation, which is Pareto dom-
inated by mutual cooperation. In the latter case of moderately negative interactions, it leads
to mutual cooperation, which is Pareto dominated by mutual non-cooperation. CG situa-
tions arise if between-group interactions are rather strong either positively or negatively. In
both cases, coordination situations emerge when deciding whether to cooperate. IH situations
arise if between-group interactions are strongly negative and relatively weak, either positively
or negatively. In these cases, self-interest in both groups is sucient to guarantee a Pareto
superior outcome.
Our simple framework of the model is applicable to a wide variety of socio-economic prob-
lems. Investigation of the case with negative between-group interactions can apply to problems
such as arms races between two military alliances and advertising competitions between two
tourist sites. The case with positive interactions corresponds to CO2 reductions between two
countries and team productions with two groups or departments in one company. The case of
asymmetric direction of between-group interactions and the case of unidirectional interaction
can apply to certain situations. One such situation is a unidirectional transboundary pollu-
tion problem: members of an upstream country make eorts to reduce pollutants, which is
benecial to members of a downstream country. However, the eorts made by members of
the downstream country to prevent the pollutants from entering their country do not benet
the members of the upstream country. Another example is the relationship between domestic
and foreign militaries against terrorists: domestic militaries contribute toward preemptively
eliminating terrorists hiding in their own countries, which is also benecial to foreign mili-
taries. However, foreign militaries contributing toward defensive prevention of the terrorists
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inltrating their national borders is not benecial to domestic militaries in the above context.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 characterizes
the possible Nash equilibria in the second stage (contribution stage). Section 4 investigates
endogenous formation of intra-group cooperation in the rst stage (cooperation stage). Then,
we characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. Section 5 conducts welfare
analysis in the symmetric group case, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider two groups A and B. Each group i 2 fA;Bg consists of two agents 1 and 2: agent
A1 and A2 are in group A and B1 and B2 are in group B.5 In each group, there is one group-
specic public good that is voluntarily provided by group members k 2 f1; 2g. Let agent ik's
(agent k in group i) contributions to the group-specic public good be gik and let
GA = gA1 + gA2; and GB = gB1 + gB2
be the total amount of group-specic public goods in groups A and B, respectively (i.e., the
group-specic public goods are pure public goods for its members). Agent k in group i is
assumed to have initial endowment (income) yik, and allocates it between private consumption
xik and contribution gik so as to maximize utilities. To make analyses simple and clear, we
postulate a simple utility function:
Uik = U ik(xik;	i) = xik 	i; (1)
where 	i is the total amount of public goods enjoyed (consumed) by members in group i.6 We
specify group i's consumption of public goods 	i as:
	i = Fi +Gi + iGj ; (2)
where Fi > 0 is an initial endowment of group-specic public goods,7 Gj (j 6= i 2 fA;Bg) is
the level of public goods provided by the other group, and i 2 [ 1; 1] represents the direction
and degree of externalities of public goods provided by group j to group i.8
Parameter i represents between-group interaction, and the combination of i and j enables
us to describe diverse socio-economic situations: If i is positive (negative), then the public
good of group j (Gj) has positive (negative) externality on group i's public good. If i = 1
for all i = fA;Bg, then the public good is a standard pure public good where each group's
4For the two counterterrorism policies, pre-emption and deterrence, see Sandler and Siqueira (2006).
5In this paper, we assume that the two groups and their members are exogenously determined by geographical,
institutional, or historical reasons. Therefore, we do not consider the reconstruction of the group members and
the movement of individuals between the groups.
6The utility function implies that the marginal propensity to consume public goods is 1=2, which seems to
be quite high. Although the utility specication appears to be rather ad hoc, it enables us to derive certain
interesting theoretical results concerning the relationship between within-group cooperation and between-group
interaction. In addition, our corollary is qualitatively unchanged if we assume a more general utility function.
7The initial endowment of group-specic public goods Fi is incorporated into 	i in order to assure that the
total amount of public goods in group i is positive; 	i > 0.
8Throughout the paper, we mean that i 6= j (and k 6= l) when we use i and j (and k and l) at the same time.
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contribution to the public good is perfectly substitutable. An archetypical example of this
is voluntary reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by two countries, each of which have two
districts.9 If i =  1 for all i = fA;Bg, then the amount of public goods is reduced exactly by
the public goods provided by the other group. An archetypical example is arms race between
two military blocks, each of which has two countries (Ihori 2001). National defense is a pure
public good for countries in the same block, and an equal increase in national defense by two
blocks leaves the national security of both blocks unchanged. If i > 0 and j < 0, then
the amount of public goods in group i is augmented by increases in Gj , but the amount of
public goods in group j is reduced by increases in Gi. An example of this asymmetric direction
of externalities is the relationship between domestic and foreign militaries against terrorists:
country j's eorts to eliminate terrorists hiding in country j reduce country i's risk of being
attacked; thus, they are benecial to country i. However, country i's eorts to prevent the
terrorists from inltrating its national border increase country j's risk of domestic terrorism
and are not benecial to country j.
The budget constraint of each agent is given by xik+gik = yik, where yik is the exogenously
given endowed resources (incomes) of agent ik. Notationally, let
YA = yA1 + yA2; YB = yB1 + yB2
be the total endowed resources of group A and B, respectively.
The timing of the game is as follows; in the rst stage of the game (cooperation stage), each
agent simultaneously decides whether to cooperate in providing group-specic public goods
with other agents in the same group, taking the other group's decision on cooperation as
given. In the second stage of the game (contribution stage), each agent determines his/her vol-
untary contributions to group-specic public goods either cooperatively or non-cooperatively
according to the commitment in the cooperation stage.
3 Equilibrium in the Contribution Stage
We solve the model backwards. In the second stage, we have four cases to consider: (1)
Case NN refers to the situation where each agent non-cooperatively determines his/her own
contribution to group-specic public goods in both groups, taking the behavior of every other
agent as given. (2) Case CN refers to the situation where agents in group A cooperatively decide
their contribution and each agent in group B non-cooperatively decides his/her contribution.
(3) Case NC refers to the opposite of case CN, i.e., the situation where group A does not
cooperate but group B does. (4) Case CC refers to the situation where in both group, agents
cooperatively determines their contributions to group-specic public goods.10
9The case with i > 0 and j = 0 can illustrate a situation of unidirectional transboundary pollutions
where country j's pollution harms country j and partly country i, and members of country i try to prevent the
pollutants from entering their country.
10In the appendix, we briey investigate a case where an agent in one group chooses to cooperate with an
agent in another group.
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3.1 Case NN: Cooperation does not occur in both groups
In the case where within-group cooperation does not occur in both groups, the reaction function
of agent k in group i can be derived by maximizing (1) with respect to xik and gik, subject to
his/her budget constraint, while taking Gj as given. For i; j = fA;Bg; k; l = f1; 2g, we have
gik =
1
2
(yik   Fi)  12 (gil + iGj) : (3)
Clearly, agent ik's contribution to public goods is a strategic substitute for agent il's contribu-
tion, and is also a strategic substitute (complement) for the other group's contribution when
i is positive (negative). We obtain the second-stage equilibrium gik and Gi:
gNNik =
3Fi + 2yik(3  ij)  yil(3  2ij)  i(Yj   2Fj)
9  4ij ; (4a)
GNNi =
3(Yi   2Fi)  2i(Yj   2Fj)
9  4ij : (4b)
Similarly, we have agent ik's utility in the second-stage Nash equilibrium:
UNNik =

3Fi + (3  2ij)Yi + i(Yj   2Fj)
2
(9  4ij)2 : (5)
We nd that UNNik and G
NN
i depend on total income Yi and Yj and not on its individual income
(yik and yjk). This implies that ex-ante within-group income redistribution does not aect the
equilibrium utility of all agents in both groups, which corresponds to the famous neutrality
result demonstrated by Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). However, ex-ante income
redistribution among dierent groups aects the utility of agents as well as the total amount
of public goods unless A = B = 1. Since (3 2ij) > i holds for all i; j 2 [ 1; 1], we nd
that income redistribution among dierent groups benets the recipient and harms the donor
agents. Note that when A = B = 1, both intra-group and inter-group income redistributions
do not aect the equilibrium unless all agents continue to make positive contributions after
the redistribution.
3.2 Case CC: Cooperation occurs in both groups
We next consider the case CC where cooperation occurs in both groups. In each group,
contribution to public goods are decided by maximizing the sum of group members' utilityP
k Uik = (Yi Gi)(Fi+Gi+ iGj) subject to budget constraint xi1+ xi2+Gi = Yi given Gj .
Thus, we have the following reaction function:
Gi =
1
2
(Yi   Fi)  12iGj : (6)
Because of the existence of within-group cooperation, there is no strategic relationship between
agents in the same group. Thus, we have
GCCi =
2 (Yi   Fi)  i (Yj   Fj)
4  ij ; (7)
UCCik =
[2Fi + (2  ij)Yi + j (Yj   Fj)]2
2(4  ij)2 : (8)
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It follows from (7) and (8) that within-group income redistribution does not aect the amount
of public goods and the utility in Nash equilibrium, while between-group income redistribution
does aect them (except for the case of A = B = 1).11
3.3 Cases CN and NC: One group cooperates and the other does not
We next consider the cases where one group decides to cooperate, while another decides not
to cooperate in the rst stage. Here, we derive the equilibrium of case CN where members in
group A cooperate while members in group B do not.
It can be easily conrmed that group A's reaction function is given as (6), while that of
agents in group B is given as (3). In the equilibrium, the amount of group A's public goods,
individual contributions made by members in group B, and the amount of group B's public
goods are obtained by
GCNA =
3 (YA   FA)  A (YB   2FB)
6  2AB ; (9a)
gCNBk =
(4  AB) yBk   (2  AB) yBl   B (YA   FA)  2FB
6  2AB ; (9b)
GCNB =
YB   2FB   B (YA   FA)
3  AB : (9c)
The equilibrium utility of each member is obtained by
UCNAk =
[3FA + (3  2AB)YA + A(YB   2FB)]2
8(3  AB)2 ; (10a)
UCNBk =
[2FB + (2  AB)YB + B(YA   FA)]2
4(3  AB)2 : (10b)
Note that regardless of whether a group cooperates, intra-group income redistribution does
not aect the total amount of public goods and the utility of all agents.
Finally, the equilibrium outcome gNCAk , G
NC
A , G
NC
B , U
NC
Ak , and U
NC
Bk in the reverse case (Case
NC) can easily be obtained by replacing A to B in Eqs. (9a), (9b), (9c), (10a), and (10b).
4 Equilibrium in the Cooperation Stage
We now characterize the cooperation stage where each agent simultaneously decides whether
to cooperate with their group members. Figure 1 shows the payo matrix for the cooperation
stage. In the gure, N is the strategy `Not Cooperate' and C is the strategy `Cooperate.'
Now we dene    AB 2 [ 1; 1]. We obtain the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 UCCAk R UNCAk and UCCBk R UCNBk hold when   Q
 
2 p2  0:59.
11We assume that, irrespective of income heterogeneities among agents, xik and gik in cooperating group i
are decided so that each member in the cooperating group obtains the same utility level. This assumption is
reasonable because the equilibrium utility of agents in the non-cooperating group (5) is identical even when
their incomes are dierent. For example, if we consider the case where gains from cooperation are allocated to
cooperating members by Nash bargaining, then they should be allocated equally because the utility of members
at the threat point is identical.
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A-member
B-member
N C
N UNNAk , U
NN
Bk U
NC
Ak , U
NC
Bk
C UCNAk , U
CN
Bk U
CC
Ak , U
CC
Bk
Figure 1: Cooperation game in normal form (N: Not cooperate; C: Cooprate)
Proof. Using and arranging (8) and (10b), we have
UCCAk   UNCAk =

2FA + (2   )YA + A(YB   FB)
2
4(4   )2(3   )2
h
2  4  +  2
i
;
UCCBk   UCNBk =

2FB + (2   )YB + B(YA   FA)
2
4(4   )2(3   )2
h
2  4  +  2
i
:
Thus, we nd that when another group chooses Cooperate, each group benets from choosing
Cooperate if and only if [2  4  +  2] > 0 (i.e.,   < 2 p2  0:59). 
The lemma implies that the strategy Cooperate is the best response to another group's
Cooperate if the interdependencies are not very strong in the same direction or are opposite
directions (  < 0:59). In contrast, the strategy Not Cooperate is the best response to another
group's Cooperate if the interdependency is strong in the same direction (  > 0:59). Interest-
ingly, this condition is the same for all agents even when yik, Yi, and Fi dier among agents
or groups.
Lemma 2 UCNAk R UNNAk and UNCBk R UNNBk hold when   Q 3(2 
p
2)=4  0:44.
Proof. Using and arranging Eqs. (5) and (10a), we have
UCNAk   UNNAk =

3FA + (3  2 )YA + A(YB   FB)
2
8(3   )2(9  4 )2
h
9  24  + 8 2
i
;
UNCBk   UNNBk =

3FB + (3  2 )YB + B(YA   FA)
2
8(3   )2(9  4 )2
h
9  24  + 8 2
i
:
Thus, we nd that the strategy Cooperate is the best response to another group's Cooperate
if and only if [9  24  + 8 2] > 0 (i.e.,   < 3(2 p2)=4  0:44). 
The lemma implies that the strategy Cooperate is the best response to another group's
Not Cooperate if the interdependencies are not very strong in the same direction and are
opposite directions (  < 0:44). The threshold value of   is smaller than that in Lemma 1.
Also note that, as in Lemma 1, the condition is the same for all agents when yik, Yi, and Fi
dier among agents or groups.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the cooperation stage,
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(i) (C;C) is a unique Nash equilibrium for   2 [ 1; 0:44),
(ii) (C;C) and (N;N) are two Nash equilibria for   2 [0:44; 0:59].
(iii) (N;N) is a unique Nash equilibrium for   2 (0:59; 1].
This proposition holds independently of yik, Yi, Fi for all i 2 fA;Bg and k 2 f1; 2g as long as
all agents are positive contributors in equilibrium.
Proof. Immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Proposition 1 implies when A and B have opposite signs (i.e., asymmetric direction of
between-group interactions),   must be negative implying that cooperation necessarily occurs
in each group.12 When between-group interactions are in the same direction and are suciently
weak (strong), cooperation occurs (does not occur) in each group. More interestingly, the
threshold level of   is the same for each group irrespective of the dierence of yik, Yi, Fi. The
striking properties of the results are summarized by the following corollary:
Corollary As long as all agents are positive contributors in equilibrium,
(a) income redistribution within a group has no eect on the equilibrium utility of each agent
as well as the decision to cooperate,
(b) income redistribution between groups has no eect on the decision to cooperate.
(c) any kind of income growth has no eect on the decision to cooperate.
Corollary-(a) corresponds to the famous Warr's neutrality theorem (Warr 1983). Corollary-
(b) and -(c) are novel and can be considered as new types of neutrality properties: the agents'
choice between cooperating or not is independent of absolute income levels, income distribu-
tions, and initial levels of group-specic public goods.
5 Welfare Implications
We next investigate whether endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is benecial for
both groups. For the sake of simplicity, we hereafter assume that both groups are symmetric13
(FA = FB = F and YA = YB = Y ) and the directions of between-group interactions are the
same between groups (A = B = ).14 Thus, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3 In the symmetric case, UCCik R UNNik holds when  R (
p
2  2)=2   0:29.
12In addition, when between-group interactions are unidirectional (i.e., either A or B equals zero, then
cooperation necessarily occurs in each group.
13Note that we still allow the income dierences between agents as long as the sum of the members' income
are same between the two groups.
14The welfare eect of endogenous formation of within-group cooperation in the case of asymmetric directions
of between-group interactions seems to be obvious. If A > 0 and B < 0, then cooperation occurs in both
groups A and B (Proposition 1), and the mutual cooperation is benecial to the member in group A and is not
benecial to the member in group B as compared to the case of mutual non-cooperation.
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Proof. From a symmetric assumption (i.e., FA = FB = F , YA = YB = Y , and A = B = )
and Eqs. (5) and (8), we have
UCCik   UNNik =

F + Y (1 + )
2
2(2 + )2(3 + 2)2
h
1 + 4 + 22
i
;
which has the positive sign if (1 + 4 + 22) > 0. This condition leads to  <  (2 +p2)=2 
 1:70 and  >  (2 p2)=2   0:29. Because  2 [ 1; 1], we have proven that  > (<) 0:29
is sucient for UCCik > (<) U
NN
ik . 
This lemma implies that when the externality is negative and suciently strong that  <
 0:29, then the situation where within-group cooperation occurs take in both groups is Pareto
dominated by the situation where cooperation does not occur in both groups.
Proposition 2 In a symmetric equilibrium,
(i) For  2 [ 1; 0:77), the Nash equilibrium (N;N) Pareto dominates the outcome (C;C).
(ii) For  2 [ 0:77; 0:66), the Nash equilibria are (N;N) and (C;C), and the outcome
(N;N) Pareto dominates the outcome (C;C).
(iii) For  2 [ 0:66; 0:29), the Nash equilibrium (C;C) is Pareto dominated by the outcome
(N;N).
(iv) For  2 [ 0:29; 0:66), the Nash equilibrium (C;C) Pareto dominates the outcome (N;N).
(v) For  2 [0:66; 0:77), the Nash equilibria are (N;N) and (C;C), and the outcome (C;C)
Pareto dominates the outcome (N;N).
(vi) For  2 [0:77; 1], the Nash equilibrium (N;N) is Pareto dominated by the outcome (C;C).
Proof. Applying the symmetric assumption to Lemmas 1 and 2, we have
UCCAk R UNCAk , jj Q 
q
2 
p
2  0:77;
UCNAk R UNNAk , jj Q 
q
3(2 p2)
2
 0:66:
Thus, the strategy Cooperate is the dominant strategy for  0:66   < 0:66, and the strategy
Not Cooperate is the dominant strategy for  <  0:77 and   0:77. If  0:77   <  0:66
and 0:66   < 0:77, (N;N) and (C;C) are both Nash equilibria in the cooperation stage.
Combining them with Lemma 3 proves the proposition. .
Proposition 2 indicates the welfare implication of within-group cooperation. Figure 2 illus-
trates the results. The prisoners' dilemma (PD) situations emerge when  2 [ 0:66; 0:29)
and  2 [0:77; 1], which are represented by the dark shaded areas in the gure. In the former
situation ( 2 [ 0:66; 0:29)), within-group cooperation emerges in both groups, but the util-
ity of each agent is smaller compared to that in mutual non-cooperation. In the latter situation
( 2 [0:77; 1]), no cooperation occurs even though mutual within-group cooperation is bene-
cial to all agents. In contrast, the invisible hand (IH) situations emerge when  2 [ 1; 0:77)
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dominant
Pareto
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The degree of between!group interaction !Γ"
Figure 2: Nash and Pareto-dominant (symmetric) equilibria and the degree of between-group
interactions
and  2 [ 0:29; 0:66). IH situations mean that endogenous decisions to cooperate lead to
Pareto superior outcomes. In the former situation ( 2 [ 1; 0:77)), the between-group inter-
actions are strongly negative; thus, each group cannot cooperate out of fear that cooperation
will induce another group to contribute more. Thus, mutual non-cooperation is benecial to
all agents in this arms race situation. In the latter situation, between-group interactions are
positively or negatively mild. Therefore, each group can decide whether to cooperate, without
much regard for another group's reaction, stimulating benecial mutual cooperation. Finally,
the coordination game (CG) situations emerge when  2 [ 0:77; 0:66) and  2 [0:66; 0:77),
which are represented by the lighter shaded areas in Figure 2. In the former (latter) situation,
mutual non-cooperation (cooperation) is better for all agents, but there are two Nash equilibria
(N;N) and (C;C).15 Figure 3 provides numerical examples in which the parameter values are
(Y = 20, F = 10) for negative  and (Y = 20, F = 0) for positive .16 In each payo matrix,
players' best responses are underlined. The gure conrms the results shown in Proposition 2.
6 Concluding Remarks
When externalities exist both within and beyond the boundaries of a group, within-group
cooperation may not occur for strategic reasons. This paper studies the eect of between-group
interaction on endogenous determination of within-group cooperation in a simple two-group
model of private provision of public goods. Our major results can be summarized as follows.
First, between-group interactions play a dominant role in promoting within-group cooperation.
In particular, when between-group interactions are in the same direction and weak (strong),
within-group cooperation to provide public goods will (will not) occur in each group. On
the other hand, when between-group interactions are in opposite directions or unidirectional,
within-group cooperation will necessarily occur. Second, endogenous formation of cooperation
is independent of the absolute (individual) levels of income as well as of income distributions
15We can solve the coordination issue regarding multiple Nash equilibria by using the concept of risk dominance
as dened by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). If we apply this concept, tedious calculations indicate that  <
 0:7002 is sucient to ensure the equilibrium (N;N) to be a risk-dominant equilibrium in the former situation.
Likewise,  < 0:7144 is sucient to ensure the equilibrium (C;C) to be a risk-dominant equilibrium in the latter
situation. In addition, if we consider the case where decisions to cooperate are made sequentially in the rst
stage, the unique Nash equilibrium coincides with Pareto dominant equilibrium.
16The dierence in the value of F serves to ensure the interior solution.
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AB
N C
N 100, 100 56, 78
C 78, 56 50, 50
(a) IH:  =  1
A
B
N C
N 189, 189 140, 186
C 186, 140 143, 143
(b) CG:  =  0:7
A
B
N C
N 225, 225 186, 238
C 238, 186 200, 200
(c) PD:  =  0:5
A
B
N C
N 204, 204 222, 226
C 226, 222 247, 247
(d) IH:  = 0:25
A
B
N C
N 239, 239 310, 235
C 235, 310 317, 317
(e) CG:  = 0:7
A
B
N C
N 256, 256 400, 200
C 200, 400 356, 356
(f) PD:  = 1
Figure 3: Numerical Examples: Y = 20, F = 10 (when   0), F = 0 (when  > 0).
between agents. This result corresponds to an extended version of Warr's neutrality theorem.
Finally, we show whether endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is benecial or
harmful to each group depending on the degree of between-group interactions. The variation
in the interaction degree yields three dierent types of games in the cooperation stage: the
Prisoners' Dilemma, Coordination Game, and Invisible Hand.
Admittedly, our analysis is conducted in a highly simplied framework and may overlook
several features. First, we assume both the number of members in each group and the number
of groups to be two. The dierences between group sizes will aect the protability of forming
within-group cooperation in each group. Second, we consider only the linear representation of
between-group externalities (i.e., we assume that one group's contributions have linear eects
on another group's public goods provisions). However, between-group interactions concerning
public goods provision may be diverse, including non-linear relationships such as conict be-
tween two groups (e.g., Niou and Tan 2005), contest between two groups (e.g., Baik 2008), and
rent-seeking between two groups (e.g., Baik and Lee 2000; Cheikbossian 2010). Thus, our re-
sults obtained from the linear specication of between-group interactions should be interpreted
as a benchmark. Finally, the validity of our theoretical results on endogenous formation of co-
operation could be tested by laboratory experiments. For instance, Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
(1994), Bornstein et al. (2002), and Reuben and Tyran (2010) experimentally investigate the
eects of inter-group competition or conict on intra-group cooperation. It will be interesting
to experimentally investigate how within-group cooperation is aected by dierent types and
degrees of between-group interactions. These issues will be examined in future research.
Appendix
In this appendix, we investigate whether agents have unilateral incentive to cooperate across
group boundaries. We consider the case where agents A1 and B1 cooperate with each other and
agents A2 and B2 do not. In this case, agents A1 and B1 choose gA1 and gB1 so as to maximize
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joint payos UA1 + UB1, given gA2 and gB2. Agent A2 (B2) independently chooses gA2 (gB2)
so as to maximize its own payo UA2 (UB2). We assume that all agents are symmetric. Then,
after some manipulations, we obtain the equilibrium utility of agents A1 and B1 as
UA1[B1A1 = U
A1[B1
B1 =
[F + (1 + )Y ]
(3 + )2(3 + 2)2
:
Thus, we have
UA1[B1A1   UNNA1 =  


F + (1 + )Y
23 + (3 + )
(1 + )(3 + )2(3 + 2)2
R 0,  Q 0:
This shows that agents have (do not have) incentives for unilaterally cooperating with an
agent in another group for  < 0 ( > 0). The intuition is quite straightforward: if between-
group interactions are positive, agents A2 and B2 can free ride on increases in the amount of
public goods that are brought about by cooperation between agents A1 and B1. On the other
hand, if between-group interactions are negative, agents A2 and B2 reluctantly increase their
contribution because the amount of public goods is reduced by cooperation between agents A1
and B2.
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